Fareed Zakaria on “How to defeat ISIS”

Last weekend, Fareed Zarakia began his CNN show, Fareed Zakaria GPS, by discussing President Obama’s speech on ISIS.  Zakaria provided his “take” on “how to defeat ISIS.”

Here is a description of the segment from the CNN website:

President Obama’s speech Wednesday night outlined a tough, measured strategy to confront ISIS. But let’s make sure in the execution of this strategy that the U.S. learns something from the 13 years since September 11, 2001 and the war against al Qaeda.

Here are a few lessons to think about:

One – Don’t always take the bait. The United States has to act against this terror group. But it should do so at a time and manner of its choosing rather than jumping when ISIS wants it to jump.

Lesson two: Don’t overestimate the enemy. ISIS is a formidable foe, but the counterforces to it have only just begun…While ISIS is much more sophisticated than al Qaeda in its operations and technology, it has one major, inherent weakness. Al Qaeda was an organization that was pan-Islamic, trying to appeal to all Muslims. This group is a distinctly sectarian organization. ISIS is anti-Shiite as well as deeply hostile to Kurds, Christians and many other inhabitants in the Middle East. This means that it has large numbers of foes in the region who will fight against it, not because the United States wants them to but in their own interests.

Lesson number three: Remember politics. The Obama administration has mapped out a smart strategy in Iraq, pressing the Baghdad government to include more Sunnis. But that is yet to happen – the Shiite parties have dragged their feet over any major concessions to the Sunnis. This is a crucial issue because if the United States is seen as defending two non-Sunni regimes – Iraq and Syria – against a Sunni uprising, it will not win.

Watch the video for the full Take, or read the WaPo column

Fareed Zakaria on “How to defeat ISIS”

Last weekend, Fareed Zarakia began his CNN show, Fareed Zakaria GPS, by discussing President Obama’s speech on ISIS.  Zakaria provided his “take” on “how to defeat ISIS.”

Here is a description of the segment from the CNN website:

President Obama’s speech Wednesday night outlined a tough, measured strategy to confront ISIS. But let’s make sure in the execution of this strategy that the U.S. learns something from the 13 years since September 11, 2001 and the war against al Qaeda.

Here are a few lessons to think about:

One – Don’t always take the bait. The United States has to act against this terror group. But it should do so at a time and manner of its choosing rather than jumping when ISIS wants it to jump.

Lesson two: Don’t overestimate the enemy. ISIS is a formidable foe, but the counterforces to it have only just begun…While ISIS is much more sophisticated than al Qaeda in its operations and technology, it has one major, inherent weakness. Al Qaeda was an organization that was pan-Islamic, trying to appeal to all Muslims. This group is a distinctly sectarian organization. ISIS is anti-Shiite as well as deeply hostile to Kurds, Christians and many other inhabitants in the Middle East. This means that it has large numbers of foes in the region who will fight against it, not because the United States wants them to but in their own interests.

Lesson number three: Remember politics. The Obama administration has mapped out a smart strategy in Iraq, pressing the Baghdad government to include more Sunnis. But that is yet to happen – the Shiite parties have dragged their feet over any major concessions to the Sunnis. This is a crucial issue because if the United States is seen as defending two non-Sunni regimes – Iraq and Syria – against a Sunni uprising, it will not win.

Watch the video for the full Take, or read the WaPo column

Why They Hate Us, 13 Years Later

Shortly after 9/11, Fareed Zakaria wrote a piece for Newsweek, entitled “Why They Hate Us.”  With the thirteen year anniversary of 9/11 approaching, Zakaria updated his article in a Washington Post column titled “Why they still hate us, 13 years later.”  Zakaria began his show GPS discussing the Washington Post piece.  

Here is how it began: 

Watching the gruesome execution videos, I felt some of the same emotions I did after 9/11. Barbarism is designed to provoke anger, and it succeeded. But in September 2001, it also made me ask, “Why do they hate us?” I tried to answer that question in an essay for Newsweek that struck a chord with readers. I reread it to see what I got right and wrong and what I’ve learned in the past 13 years.

It’s not just al-Qaeda. I began by noting that Islamic terrorism is not the isolated behavior of a handful of nihilists. There is a broader culture that has been complicit or at least unwilling to combat it. Things have changed on this front but not nearly enough.

It’s not an Islam problem but an Arab problem. In the early 2000s, Indonesia was our biggest concern because of a series of terrorist attacks there after 9/11. But over the past decade, jihad and even Islamic fundamentalism have not done well in Indonesia — the largest Muslim country in the world, larger in that sense than Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya and the Gulf states put together. Or look at India, which is right next door to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s headquarters in Pakistan, but very few of its 165 million Muslims are members of al-Qaeda. Zawahiri has announced a bold effort to recruit Indian Muslims, but I suspect it will fail.

Read the Washington Post column

Why They Hate Us, 13 Years Later

Shortly after 9/11, Fareed Zakaria wrote a piece for Newsweek, entitled “Why They Hate Us.”  With the thirteen year anniversary of 9/11 approaching, Zakaria updated his article in a Washington Post column titled “Why they still hate us, 13 years later.”  Zakaria began his show GPS discussing the Washington Post piece.  

Here is how it began: 

Watching the gruesome execution videos, I felt some of the same emotions I did after 9/11. Barbarism is designed to provoke anger, and it succeeded. But in September 2001, it also made me ask, “Why do they hate us?” I tried to answer that question in an essay for Newsweek that struck a chord with readers. I reread it to see what I got right and wrong and what I’ve learned in the past 13 years.

It’s not just al-Qaeda. I began by noting that Islamic terrorism is not the isolated behavior of a handful of nihilists. There is a broader culture that has been complicit or at least unwilling to combat it. Things have changed on this front but not nearly enough.

It’s not an Islam problem but an Arab problem. In the early 2000s, Indonesia was our biggest concern because of a series of terrorist attacks there after 9/11. But over the past decade, jihad and even Islamic fundamentalism have not done well in Indonesia — the largest Muslim country in the world, larger in that sense than Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya and the Gulf states put together. Or look at India, which is right next door to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s headquarters in Pakistan, but very few of its 165 million Muslims are members of al-Qaeda. Zawahiri has announced a bold effort to recruit Indian Muslims, but I suspect it will fail.

Read the Washington Post column

The United States Gains a New Enemy in the War on Terror

 

A recent CNN article describes a decision by Congress to list a Nigerian extremist group called Boko Haram on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list. Boko Haram, whose name means “Western Education is Sacrilege”, is attempting to control northeastern Nigeria and impose strict Islamic sharia law in the region.

The organization has existed for several years and has tangible ties to al Qaeda. They have been responsible for at least 3,000 deaths in western Africa since 2009, and have recently begun amplifying their extremist activities.

In deciding to officially name Boko Haram a terrorist organization, Congress has concluded a pointed debate on the issue. On one hand, the group is almost entirely regional. While they have declared a “war on Christians”, their reach and objectives are generally limited to the geography in and around Nigeria. Thus, while they are a danger in their region and could become a larger issue with increased support from al Qaeda, the group poses no real threat to domestic American interests at this time. As such, the appropriateness of declaring them a terrorist enemy is not necessarily obvious, and our conflicting interests are more remote than against al Qaeda itself.

On the other hand, naming Boko Haram a terrorist organization might induce them to become a threat in fact. While the article does not point out any attacks directed at Americans in Africa, Boko Haram could react to this latest news by making a point to do so.

The article does interestingly point out the tools which become available to America once Congress puts a group on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list. Regarding Boko Haram, Congress now has the power to “freeze assets, impose travel bans on known members and affiliates, and prohibit Americans from offering material support.” These tools could become pretty hefty deterrent forces if Boko Haram attempts to assert influence in a wider region than Nigeria itself.

While this determination is apparently a done deal, so to speak, consider the policy implications of allowing America to label foreign organizations as terrorists even when they pose no actual threat to American interests. Should Congress be able to do this? Should there be limits or guidelines restricting Congress’s discretion in so designating organizations? Are such designations even appropriately within the discretion of the United States, or should the United Nations be in charge of dealing with groups who have no known capability or desire to directly harm American citizens? What other issues might arise under this approach?